Woodhull, Winifred. "Sexuality, Power, and the Question of Rape." Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance. Eds. Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988. 167-76.
In her essay, Winifred Woodhull challenges the Foucauldian idea that the preferred strategy to resist sexual oppression is to “‘desexualize’ sexuality by multiplying the diffusing pleasures, in order to cancel the now-obsolete understanding of it as a circumscribe domain fundamentally opposed to power and the law,” which is consistent with new developments within women’s movement in the 1980’s, namely, the tendency of advancing beyond the realm of sexuality and recognizing sexuality as “bound up with economic and political structures, language and philosophy, the world of work and the world of play.” Woodhull, however, finds the desexualization strategy problematic, especially when we are brought to consider the issue of rape. Woodhull argues that “rape, or the fear of rape, are experienced by women sexually, not just as domination,” in a culture where “many forces converge to define women as essentially sexual beings.” Legal battles against rape to Woodhull are not what bring “the social relations of production and reproduction” necessary therein. To Woodhull, we must recognize that “the very coherence of the bourgeois state depends upon an illusory legal equality masking not only economic inequality and class domination but also the general social and sexual subordination of women.” The notion of “taking control of our bodies” that serves as the ground for legal rights battles is tied to the capitalist ideology of individualism, and therefore, drawing on Marxist critical theory, Woodhull proposes a collective rather than individual strategy for women to fight against rape, organizing themselves with other women to protect themselves and thus creating an alternative to the forced options between problematic “protection” and no protection at all.
This is probably one of the most polemic criticisms on this blog. I think Woodhull points out probably the biggest difficulty in applying Foucault's theory in feminism and, especially, feminist activism. To some extent, Foucault did not focus his concerns on the collective struggle of the mass. In other words, he was interested in how the individual subject is constructed historically in power relations. However, in the case of rape, there is an urgency that Foucault's "saintly" theory cannot address. I think Woodhull has made a good case here addressing this urgency.
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Taylor, Dianna. "Foucault's Ethos: Guide(Post) for Change."
Taylor, Dianna. "Foucault's Ethos: Guide(Post) for Change." Feminism and the Final Foucault. Eds. Dianna Taylor and Karen Vintges. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004.
In this chapter, Dianna Taylor asks the question of how to understand a “crisis in meaning” produced by the 911 attack in the United States that is analogous to Europe through the Second World War, and suggests that Foucault, especially with his final works on self-practices, or ethos, can serve as a “guidepost,” in Hannah Arendt’s term, for us to understand the post-911 situation, the “hybrid war-law” rhetoric of the U.S. government, and domination and possibility of resistance in general. In her analysis of the 911 rhetoric, Taylor argues that the unprecedentedness of the 911 attack created a crisis in meaning (how to make sense of it?), followed by a rejection of reality, which “paves the way for its replacement with ideology, or the reinforcement of existing ideology” that could easily become normalizing and oppressive. This explains the rhetorical phenomena such as the government’s interpretation of the attack as a war act, the analogy drawn between 911 and the Pearl Harbor, and the reaction that a swift and decisive military reaction is required. “Given the continued relevance of the complexities and dangers” of the play of ideology in the post-911 U.S., therefore, Taylor is compelled to ask “how might the current crisis in meaning be productively negotiated?” To do so, she draws on Foucault’s later work on self-practices, or ethos, “a way of life,” which is at once critical, creative, and political, to “transform” the subject and productively resist domination in the context of power relations.
Unlike Nancy Hartsock and Nancy Fraser, who criticize the Foucauldian thoughts for being unproductive in activism, Taylor views feminism “compatible with the kind of critically creative work that characterizes a Foucauldian ethos.” Her analysis of the post-911 discourse in the States shows how Foucualt's theory can be applied in understanding the power relations of a highly mediated society like ours. I agree with Taylor that instead of being only a resource we can draw on to understand power relations, Foucault actually "offers a vision of an emancipatory, practical politics that is able to function, even thrive, within a context where traditional foundations for action and thought are not longer reliable.” Also see Fraser, "From Discipline to Flexibilization? Reading Foucault in the Shadow of Globalization" and Hekman, Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault.
In this chapter, Dianna Taylor asks the question of how to understand a “crisis in meaning” produced by the 911 attack in the United States that is analogous to Europe through the Second World War, and suggests that Foucault, especially with his final works on self-practices, or ethos, can serve as a “guidepost,” in Hannah Arendt’s term, for us to understand the post-911 situation, the “hybrid war-law” rhetoric of the U.S. government, and domination and possibility of resistance in general. In her analysis of the 911 rhetoric, Taylor argues that the unprecedentedness of the 911 attack created a crisis in meaning (how to make sense of it?), followed by a rejection of reality, which “paves the way for its replacement with ideology, or the reinforcement of existing ideology” that could easily become normalizing and oppressive. This explains the rhetorical phenomena such as the government’s interpretation of the attack as a war act, the analogy drawn between 911 and the Pearl Harbor, and the reaction that a swift and decisive military reaction is required. “Given the continued relevance of the complexities and dangers” of the play of ideology in the post-911 U.S., therefore, Taylor is compelled to ask “how might the current crisis in meaning be productively negotiated?” To do so, she draws on Foucault’s later work on self-practices, or ethos, “a way of life,” which is at once critical, creative, and political, to “transform” the subject and productively resist domination in the context of power relations.
Unlike Nancy Hartsock and Nancy Fraser, who criticize the Foucauldian thoughts for being unproductive in activism, Taylor views feminism “compatible with the kind of critically creative work that characterizes a Foucauldian ethos.” Her analysis of the post-911 discourse in the States shows how Foucualt's theory can be applied in understanding the power relations of a highly mediated society like ours. I agree with Taylor that instead of being only a resource we can draw on to understand power relations, Foucault actually "offers a vision of an emancipatory, practical politics that is able to function, even thrive, within a context where traditional foundations for action and thought are not longer reliable.” Also see Fraser, "From Discipline to Flexibilization? Reading Foucault in the Shadow of Globalization" and Hekman, Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault.
Sawicki, Jana. "Queering Foucault and the Subject of Feminism."
Sawicki, Jana. "Queering Foucault and the Subject of Feminism." The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Ed. Gary Gutting. 2nd ed. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
In this chapter, Sawicki defends Foucault in response to the feminist critical theorists and the “queer” poststructuralist feminist theorists represented respectively by Nancy Fraser and Judith Butler. Answering Fraser’s accusations of Foucault’s ambiguity in clarifying the nature of his rejection of the “foundationalist and universalist metaphilosophical ideals” of Enlightenment humanism – as a philosophical or a practical project, and his failure to provide a “new paradigm of human freedom,” Sawicki argues that Fraser “fails to appreciate the ‘queerness’ of Foucault’s project.” Through an analysis of Foucault’s far more complex than oppositional relationship to Enlightenment humanism (which I think can only be described as “queer”), Sawicki points out that Foucault’s project is not concerned with the legitimacy of critique, but with a “new understanding of autonomy,” which requires “an empirical inquiry into the historical limits of our self-understandings,” and which leads to a new direction of critique – “critiquing critique.” It is with this detachment from established political ideals and theories, to Sawicki, that Foucault “approach[es] politics from behind.” Butler, on the other hand, advances the Foucauldian ideas of the operation of biopower and subjection through the lens of psychoanalysis, and introduces the play of the psyche and the Freudian concept of recognition in the formation of the subject (and our dear ,old Hegel would say, “I said that before any of these kids!”) into the process of subjection and subjugation. Sawicki comments that Butler’s theory of subjection is “remarkably Foucaultian in spirit,” but has gone “further than Foucault ever went.” Sawicki then defends Foucault by saying that Foucault’s concern about the normalizing impulse that would lie in such a theory.
This source is helpful in critically understanding the two very important receptions of Foucault in feminism. When consider the idea of "subjectification," I feel that Foucault's approach to psychoanalysis is more of a historical one, which sees psychology or psychoanalysis--the science of understanding our own psyche--as an instrument instead of a methodology. That's probably why he didn't go as far as Butler--because any discourse, including the emerging scientific discourse in the 19th century, can be essentializing. I think here Sawicki's explanation is fair. Also see Fraser, "From Discipline to Flexibilization? Rereading Foucaul in the Shadow of Globalization" and Butler, "Bodies and Power Revisit".
In this chapter, Sawicki defends Foucault in response to the feminist critical theorists and the “queer” poststructuralist feminist theorists represented respectively by Nancy Fraser and Judith Butler. Answering Fraser’s accusations of Foucault’s ambiguity in clarifying the nature of his rejection of the “foundationalist and universalist metaphilosophical ideals” of Enlightenment humanism – as a philosophical or a practical project, and his failure to provide a “new paradigm of human freedom,” Sawicki argues that Fraser “fails to appreciate the ‘queerness’ of Foucault’s project.” Through an analysis of Foucault’s far more complex than oppositional relationship to Enlightenment humanism (which I think can only be described as “queer”), Sawicki points out that Foucault’s project is not concerned with the legitimacy of critique, but with a “new understanding of autonomy,” which requires “an empirical inquiry into the historical limits of our self-understandings,” and which leads to a new direction of critique – “critiquing critique.” It is with this detachment from established political ideals and theories, to Sawicki, that Foucault “approach[es] politics from behind.” Butler, on the other hand, advances the Foucauldian ideas of the operation of biopower and subjection through the lens of psychoanalysis, and introduces the play of the psyche and the Freudian concept of recognition in the formation of the subject (and our dear ,old Hegel would say, “I said that before any of these kids!”) into the process of subjection and subjugation. Sawicki comments that Butler’s theory of subjection is “remarkably Foucaultian in spirit,” but has gone “further than Foucault ever went.” Sawicki then defends Foucault by saying that Foucault’s concern about the normalizing impulse that would lie in such a theory.
This source is helpful in critically understanding the two very important receptions of Foucault in feminism. When consider the idea of "subjectification," I feel that Foucault's approach to psychoanalysis is more of a historical one, which sees psychology or psychoanalysis--the science of understanding our own psyche--as an instrument instead of a methodology. That's probably why he didn't go as far as Butler--because any discourse, including the emerging scientific discourse in the 19th century, can be essentializing. I think here Sawicki's explanation is fair. Also see Fraser, "From Discipline to Flexibilization? Rereading Foucaul in the Shadow of Globalization" and Butler, "Bodies and Power Revisit".
Sawicki, Jana. Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body.
Sawicki, Jana. Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body. New York: Routledge, 1991.
Ramazanoğlu, Caroline, and Janet Holland. "Women's Sexuality and Men's Appropriation of Desire."
Ramazanoğlu, Caroline, and Janet Holland. "Women's Sexuality and Men's Appropriation of Desire." Up against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions between Foucault and Feminism. Ed. Caroline Ramazanoğlu. London; New York: Routledge, 1993. 239-64.
McWhorter, Ladelle. "Sex, Race, and Biopower: A Foucauldian Genealogy."
McWhorter, Ladelle. "Sex, Race, and Biopower: A Foucauldian Genealogy." Hypatia 19.3 (2004): 38-62.
In this essay, Ladelle McWhorter offers a genealogy of the concept of race in conjunction with Foucault's genealogical account of sexuality, and argues that the "intersection" between sex and race as many feminists assert is justified, because "the modern concept of race and the institutions and practices that developed and deployed that concept arose within the same networks of disciplinary normalization and biopower that gave us the modern concept of sex." To support her argument, the author starts with an analysis of Foucault's genealogy of sexuality, especially focusing on the role the inception of modern biology has played in the rise of the concept of sex in from the 19th century Europe, and of his account of power and disciplinary normalization in the formation of sexual categories. Then McWhorter offers an analysis of the genealogy of the concept of race, drawing parallels to that of sexuality and sexual categories. She argues that the emergence of modern biology in the 18th and the19th century also played an important role in the formation of the concept of race, for the biological perspective compelled people to perceive bodies in terms of developing stages, which led to the categorization of the deviant as the underdeveloped both in terms of sex and race. Race, the author argues, is thus formed in the same power/knowledge networks as sex, and is a "sliding signifier," which does not "mean" but "operates" to manage and control the population.
This is indeed a very interesting essay. As a "preliminary attempt" as the author notes, it offers a genealogical link between sex and race that nonetheless has been asserted, assumed and imagined by feminist thinkers. As feminist theory has been increasingly conscious of the issue of women of color, this essay provides an interesting Foucauldian lens to understand the construction of race.
In this essay, Ladelle McWhorter offers a genealogy of the concept of race in conjunction with Foucault's genealogical account of sexuality, and argues that the "intersection" between sex and race as many feminists assert is justified, because "the modern concept of race and the institutions and practices that developed and deployed that concept arose within the same networks of disciplinary normalization and biopower that gave us the modern concept of sex." To support her argument, the author starts with an analysis of Foucault's genealogy of sexuality, especially focusing on the role the inception of modern biology has played in the rise of the concept of sex in from the 19th century Europe, and of his account of power and disciplinary normalization in the formation of sexual categories. Then McWhorter offers an analysis of the genealogy of the concept of race, drawing parallels to that of sexuality and sexual categories. She argues that the emergence of modern biology in the 18th and the19th century also played an important role in the formation of the concept of race, for the biological perspective compelled people to perceive bodies in terms of developing stages, which led to the categorization of the deviant as the underdeveloped both in terms of sex and race. Race, the author argues, is thus formed in the same power/knowledge networks as sex, and is a "sliding signifier," which does not "mean" but "operates" to manage and control the population.
This is indeed a very interesting essay. As a "preliminary attempt" as the author notes, it offers a genealogical link between sex and race that nonetheless has been asserted, assumed and imagined by feminist thinkers. As feminist theory has been increasingly conscious of the issue of women of color, this essay provides an interesting Foucauldian lens to understand the construction of race.
McNay, Lois. Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender, and the Self.
McNay, Lois. Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender, and the Self. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1993.
Lois McNay's book is one of the earlier works that address the dilemma that feminism and other emancipatory politics encounter when they consider the implications of poststructural thinking on their work. In the case of feminism, on the one hand, extensive work has been drawn upon poststructural assertion that subjectivity is discursively constructed rather than fixed, which has been used in various ways. On the other hand, feminists are increasingly asking how far poststructural thought can be drawn on since it is void of value judgments and truth claims that feminist politics rests necessarily rest on. Acknowledging this dilemma, McNay proposes that Foucault's final work The Use of Pleasure, The Care of the Self and various interviews and essays are valuable resources that opens up new possibilities and new directions for productive convergence of feminism and poststructural thinking. McNay argues that Foucault's ideas of the self, and technologies of subjectification is his complements to his earlier analysis of technologies of domination where self is passively constructed by power. The analysis of technologies of subjectification, on the other hand, acknowledges the active practices of the self in constructing its own identity. McNay sees this significant turn in Foucault's work to offer valuable implications to feminism. She opposes to formulate a postmodern feminism, but she believes that Foucault's later work on the self is resonant to the emancipatory themes of feminism, which precisely hinder it to be categorized as postmodern.
Despite this, McNay points out Foucault's limitations, namely, Foucault's lack of "any basic guidelines or collective aims" that is necessary for the self to be called "out of the self on to a plane of generality where it is reminded of its responsibilities to other individuals in society." This criticism has become one of the "classic" criticisms of Foucault. To me, it seems that McNay is still faced with the same dilemma that has been haunting feminists and other thinkers and activists of emancipatory politics. This book has five chapters, each dealing with a specific theme in feminist theory. They are "Power, Body and Experience," "From the Body to the Self," "Ethics of the Self," "The Problem of Justification," and "Self and Others." Unfamiliar with these later works of Foucault, I'm nevertheless (or maybe therefore) intrigued by this book.
Lois McNay's book is one of the earlier works that address the dilemma that feminism and other emancipatory politics encounter when they consider the implications of poststructural thinking on their work. In the case of feminism, on the one hand, extensive work has been drawn upon poststructural assertion that subjectivity is discursively constructed rather than fixed, which has been used in various ways. On the other hand, feminists are increasingly asking how far poststructural thought can be drawn on since it is void of value judgments and truth claims that feminist politics rests necessarily rest on. Acknowledging this dilemma, McNay proposes that Foucault's final work The Use of Pleasure, The Care of the Self and various interviews and essays are valuable resources that opens up new possibilities and new directions for productive convergence of feminism and poststructural thinking. McNay argues that Foucault's ideas of the self, and technologies of subjectification is his complements to his earlier analysis of technologies of domination where self is passively constructed by power. The analysis of technologies of subjectification, on the other hand, acknowledges the active practices of the self in constructing its own identity. McNay sees this significant turn in Foucault's work to offer valuable implications to feminism. She opposes to formulate a postmodern feminism, but she believes that Foucault's later work on the self is resonant to the emancipatory themes of feminism, which precisely hinder it to be categorized as postmodern.
Despite this, McNay points out Foucault's limitations, namely, Foucault's lack of "any basic guidelines or collective aims" that is necessary for the self to be called "out of the self on to a plane of generality where it is reminded of its responsibilities to other individuals in society." This criticism has become one of the "classic" criticisms of Foucault. To me, it seems that McNay is still faced with the same dilemma that has been haunting feminists and other thinkers and activists of emancipatory politics. This book has five chapters, each dealing with a specific theme in feminist theory. They are "Power, Body and Experience," "From the Body to the Self," "Ethics of the Self," "The Problem of Justification," and "Self and Others." Unfamiliar with these later works of Foucault, I'm nevertheless (or maybe therefore) intrigued by this book.
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